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Horvitz & Levy is a solutions-based firm focused on appellate success. We are distinguished by our commitment to responsive service and on-going innovation in the areas of civil appellate litigation, amicus curiae support, and trial strategy consultation.

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Horvitz & Levy LLP represented J. Roger Faherty in this appeal from a $40 million judgment. Plaintiffs sued Emerald Media, Inc. (EMI), Judy Savar, EMI’s president, and Faherty, alleging that EMI had breached a contract to pay royalties on revenue generated by various “adult” satellite television channels because they were “explicit” channels, as that term was defined in the contract. Plaintiffs alleged that Faherty was liable as EMI’s alter ego. Prior to trial, Savar stipulated to entry of a $40 million judgment against EMI in return for a release of her personal liability. The case then went to trial against Faherty. The jury found he was EMI’s alter ego and awarded $22.5 million in damages. In an earlier appeal (also handled by Horvitz & Levy), the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the finding that Faherty was EMI’s alter ego, but reversed the $22.5 million damages award with directions to the trial court to conduct a retrial on whether one of the channels was an explicit channel and, depending on the outcome of that trial, enter a new judgment against Faherty for either $356,000 or zero.

Instead of conducting the retrial ordered by the Court of Appeal, the trial court on remand granted plaintiffs’ motion to amend the $40 million stipulated judgment against EMI to add Faherty as a judgment debtor on the ground that because he had been found to be EMI’s alter ego, the $40 million judgment was effectively a judgment against him. Division Eight once again reversed, holding that Faherty was not bound by the stipulated judgment because he did not consent to it and that the trial court violated the law of the case by amending the stipulated judgment instead of conducting the retrial ordered in the first opinion.